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Abstract 
This paper presents a critical assessment of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Section 2 
recalls the fiscal policy framework in the euro area. Section 3 provides an assessment of the 
first five years of the SGP. Section 4 addresses the weaknesses of the procedures: arbitrary 
criteria, insufficient economic policy co-ordination. Section 5 discusses European 
Commission’s recent proposals: strengthening its influence on national fiscal policies; 
considering ‘close-to-balance or in surplus’ underlying budgetary positions. Section 6 
discusses recent academic proposals: budgetary federalism, golden rule, permanent balance 
rule, public expenditure rule, fiscal policy committees, public debt surveillance... In section 7 
we suggest that national budgetary policies should be responsible for managing the inflation-
production trade-off, under a medium term inflation objective, while monetary policy would 
target interest rates. This policy mix would give better outcomes in terms of economic 
stabilisation than the existing framework. 
Keywords: Stability and Growth Pact, EMU, fiscal policy, monetary policy, public debt 
JEL classification: E6 
 
Résumé 
Ce texte présente une évaluation critique du Pacte de stabilité. La première partie rappelle les 
modalités actuelles du contrôle des politiques budgétaires dans la zone euro : la limite des 
déficits publics à 3 % du PIB, les programmes de stabilité, les Grandes orientations des 
politiques économiques. La deuxième partie présente une évaluation des cinq premières 
années d’existence du Pacte. La troisième partie analyse les défauts de l’organisation 
actuelle : l’arbitraire des critères de finances publiques et l’absence d’une réelle coordination 
des politiques économiques. Une quatrième partie discute des propositions récentes de la 
Commission : renforcement de son influence sur les politiques budgétaires nationales, prise 
en compte de soldes structurels proches de l’équilibre ou excédentaires. La cinquième partie 
discute des propositions récentes des économistes : fédéralisme budgétaire, règle d’or des 
finances publiques, règle d’équilibre permanent, règle de dépenses publiques, comité de 
politique budgétaire, contrôle des dettes publiques. Dans une sixième partie nous proposons 
que les politiques budgétaires nationales aient la charge de gérer l’arbitrage entre inflation et 
production, sous une contrainte d’inflation de moyen terme, tandis que la politique monétaire 
aurait un objectif de taux d’intérêt. 
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‘I know very well that the Stability Pact is stupid, like 
all decisions that are rigid’, Romano Prodi, Le Monde,  
18 October 2002. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the early days of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the provisions inherited from the 
Maastricht Treaty have been criticised by a number of economists and policy makers arguing 
that the procedures of fiscal surveillance were not providing a satisfactory framework of 
economic policy co-ordination in the European Union. The implementation of the SGP 
started in a favourable situation of high growth. Problems started to show with the economic 
slowdown of late 2000. The need for reforming the SGP became more and more obvious in 
the course of 2002. A number of economists have made different and sometimes 
contradictory proposals. The European Commission itself has made proposals. This paper 
presents the state of the debate.  
Section 2 recalls the fiscal policy framework in the euro area. Section 3 provides an 
assessment of the first five years of existence of the SGP, up to the latest economic 
developments. The weaknesses of the existing framework are addressed in Section 4. Section 
5 discusses the reforms recently proposed by the Commission. Section 6 discusses some of 
the proposals recently made by economists to improve the fiscal policy framework. We 
present our proposal in section 7. 
2. The existing fiscal policy framework 
Before the launch of the economic and monetary union (EMU), two views had been opposed 
on the conduct of fiscal policies. In one view, the EMU should allow each Member State to 
choose and run domestic fiscal policy in full independence. Independent fiscal policy is a 
prerequisite to domestic macroeconomic stabilisation in a monetary union since monetary 
policy can be conducted at the area aggregate level only and becomes ineffective in the event 
of asymmetric shocks. The exchange rate can no more be used as an instrument of economic 
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policy. Price and wage adjustments, as well as labour mobility, play a minor role only in 
Europe. But fiscal policy becomes more powerful in a monetary union as it will not be 
counteracted by interest rates rises or exchange rate depreciation. Let us assume, as in table 1, 
that six Member States are hit by a depressive shock while 3 are hit by an expansionary one. 
Monetary policy, which considers the average situation in the Union, can be at best slightly 
expansionary. In this case there is a need for different fiscal polices in order to stabilise fully 
national economies.  
According to another view, if each country was allowed to conduct fiscal policy without any 
binding rule, there would be a risk that all countries run excessively expansionary policies for 
three reasons. First, countries in a monetary union do not have to care anymore about their 
current account balance. Second, they are no more under the threat of speculation on domestic 
exchange rate and interest rate markets. Last, a country implementing an expansionary fiscal 
policy alone will not be strongly affected by the central bank’s reaction. This is illustrated in 
table 2. Country 12 implements a strongly expansionary policy. The subsequent tightening of 
monetary policy affects all countries. In the end, country 12 benefits from a gain in output, at 
the expense of the rest of the area.  
Table 1. Optimal policies in response to a shock in EMU 
 Initial shock Monetary policy Fiscal policies 
Countries 1-6 – 4 + 1 + 3 
Countries 7-9 0 + 1 – 1 
Countries 10-12 4 + 1 – 5 
Average – 1 + 1 + 0 
 
Table 2. Free rider’s policy in EMU 
 Fiscal policies Monetary policy Result 
Countries 1-11 0 – 1 – 1 
Country 12 12 – 1 11 
Average 1 – 1 0 
 
The single currency strengthens the level of interdependence between participating countries 
through two new channels. First, each country becomes potentially affected by inflation in 
partner countries as it will lead to a rise in the European central bank’s (ECB) single interest 
rate. Second, a country unable to ensure sustainable public finances would put at risk the 
financial stability of the monetary union, which could provoke a rise in long-term interest 
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rates. It should however be recalled that a Member State facing difficulty in terms of public 
finance sustainability is not allowed to ask for the help of the ECB or of any partner countries, 
which limits the risks of contagion. If participating countries still had the possibility to 
conduct domestic fiscal policy as they wish, this would be in contradiction with the decision 
to create a central bank in charge of maintaining price stability (see box 1).  
 
Box 1. On the compatibility between a single monetary policy and 
independent national fiscal policies 
The functioning of the economy in each Member State may be summarised as follows: 
i i iy d g rσ= + −  and 0i i iyπ π α= + , where yi is the level of output in the country i (as deviation 
from potential output); iπ : inflation rate in the country i, expressed as deviation from the central 
bank’s inflation target); 0iπ : initial inflation (as deviation from the target) or a price shock; di: an 
indicator of private demand and gi: an indicator of public demand (assumed to be equal to the 
public deficit); r: the single interest rate.  
Then it is not possible that each country uses fiscal policy with a view to maintaining full 
employment, while monetary policy uses the interest rate to keep the aggregate inflation of the 
area at the desired level. If 0iπ  stand on average above the central bank’s inflation target, fiscal 
and monetary policies will be incompatible. The central bank would raise the interest rate to cut 
inflation whereas national governments would raise public deficits to maintain full employment. 
This would lead to a permanent increase in both the interest rate and public deficits (Capoen, 
Sterdyniak and Villa, 1994). 
 
How can this interdependence be managed? A framework for a permanent co-ordination of 
fiscal policies and monetary policy could have been designed. This has not been the case in 
the EMU: it is difficult to imagine how decisions needed to be taken at very short notice could 
have been conditional on negotiations, with no final agreement being certain to be reached; 
the agreement would have been imposed on all countries and would have been a direct 
constraint on fiscal policies, which was politically difficult. It was decided to impose 
constraints on national fiscal policies through a Stability and Growth Pact. These constraints 
are not totally rigid. National policies kept some room for manoeuvre which could initially 
compensate for the fact that the rules were not perfectly adapted. But the institutional logic is 
such that constraints are getting stronger over time: national authorities are becoming 
progressively entangled in a ‘spider web’.  
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2.1. The institutional fiscal framework  
The monitoring of fiscal discipline is based on four elements: two criteria inherited from the 
Maastricht Treaty: the 3% of GDP deficit threshold and the 60% reference value for the ratio 
of government debt to GDP; an institutional framework to implement fiscal surveillance: the 
Stability and Growth Pact; a co-ordination process: the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. 
2.1.1. Excessive deficits and the 3% of GDP deficit threshold 
According to the article 104 of the Treaty establishing the European Community,1 ‘Member 
States shall avoid excessive government deficits’, with excessive deficits being defined as 
above 3% of GDP.2 The European Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee 
(EFC)3 prepare reports if (or if the Commission thinks there is a risk that) government deficit 
exceeds 3% of GDP. If the Commission considers the deficit to be excessive, it addresses an 
opinion to the Council. On a recommendation from the Commission, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority (with no vote from the State concerned), decides whether an excessive 
deficit exists. If this is the case, the Council addresses recommendations to the country 
concerned, with a ‘view to bringing that situation to an end’ within a year.4 If the country 
concerned does not implement the necessary measures, it may have to pay fines of between 
0.2 and 0.5% of its GDP. However, a country will not be fined in case or ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, i.e. if the deficit is generated by an unusual event out of control of the 
national authorities, or if output has fallen by more than 2% and may avoid any sanction, if 
partner countries agree, in the event of a fall in GDP of between 0.75 and 2%.  
2.1.2. The reference value for the ratio of government debt to GDP 
The Treaty establishing the European Community mentions the necessity for Member States 
to maintain the debt to GDP ratios below a reference level (60%), unless the ratio is 
‘diminishing and approaching the reference level at a satisfactory pace’. The Commission 
should prepare a report if the debt limit is breached in a country. In practice, the debt limit has 
                                                 
1 Consolidated version, Official Journal C 340, 10.11.1997. 
2 Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
3 The EFC brings together officials from the Member States’ administration (ministerial level) and central banks, 
from the Commission and the ECB. The composition and the proceedings of the Committee are confidential. 
4 The one-year period as well as the sanctions were defined in the Resolution of the European Council of 
Amsterdam on the Stability and Growth Pact, 17 June 1997, Official Journal C236, 02.08.1997.  
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not been considered since 1997, since several Member States with debt levels largely above 
60% of GDP (Italy, Belgium and Greece) were allowed to join the monetary union. However, 
it is the relevant criterion to assess fiscal sustainability.  
The Article 104 also mentions that the Commission’s ‘report shall also take into account 
whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and take into 
account all other relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary 
position of the Member States’.5 Until 2002, these elements had also been forgotten.  
2.1.3. The Stability and Growth Pact 
The SGP was adopted on 17 June 1997 at the European Council of Amsterdam. The Pact sets 
out a medium-term objective, which is to reach budgetary positions ‘close-to-balance or in 
surplus’. Each country of the euro area has to present a stability programme at the end of each 
year. Stability programmes present medium-term budgetary programmes including the current 
year, and the three following years. The stability programme must involve a macroeconomic 
medium-term projection and all planned budgetary measures. More importantly, it has to 
target a budgetary position close to balance or in surplus in the medium-run.  
These programmes are then evaluated by the Commission and the EFC. Based on these 
assessments, the Council gives an opinion on the ability of the programme to avoid excessive 
deficits and to reach a medium-run budgetary position in balance or in surplus. The Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, may address a recommendation to a given country asking for 
changes in its stability programme. On a recommendation from the Commission, the Council 
may then address recommendations to the Member State concerned, if government borrowing 
shifts away from the path towards the equilibrium, from the medium-term objective, or gets 
close to 3% of GDP. In practice Member States do not have to follow the recommendation. 
This was shown for instance twice in 2002 by the French government when it refused first to 
present a budgetary position in balance in 2004, then not even in 2006. 
2.1.4. The broad economic policy guidelines  
According to the article 99 of the Treaty, governments co-ordinate economic policies within 
the Council. This co-ordination is made through the elaboration of the broad economic policy 
                                                 
5 General Government investment is explicitly specified as gross in the Protocol on the excessive deficit 
procedure. 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak 
 - 6 -
guidelines of the Member States and of the Community (BEPGs). A text is first prepared by 
the Commission in spring each year (the recommendations). The European Parliament 
formulates an opinion. The text becomes a project at an Ecofin council, acting by a qualified 
majority. The text is discussed in June at a European council. It is then formally adopted at an 
Ecofin council. On a report from the Commission the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
may address recommendations to Member States where economic policy is not in line with 
the BEPGs. However, here again, the country is not compelled to follow these 
recommendations. This happened in February 2001, when Ireland was addressed a 
recommendation, as its budgetary policy was judged too loose considering the level of Irish 
inflation. There was a fiscal surplus of 4.4% of GDP in 2000 and Ireland decided not to 
follow the recommendation from the European authorities.  
3. The SGP: an assessment five years after 
Public deficits had widened to 5.8% of GDP in 1993 partly under the effect of the German 
reunification and mainly because of the 1993 recession: high interest rates had made it 
necessary for Member States to use fiscal policy to support activity. Restrictive fiscal policies 
run in 1996 and 1997 allowed most candidate countries to join the monetary Union. 
Budgetary efforts have been relaxed in most countries since then.  
3.1. 1997-2000: favourable economic conditions 
European economies grew at a rapid pace from 1997 to 2000. The euro area public deficit 
shrunk from – 2.6% of GDP in 1997 to – 1.0 in 2000 (excluding UMTS licences). Lower 
interest payments explained 1 percentage point of the reduction, the effects of the economic 
cycle 1.2 percentage points, whereas discretionary measures increased the deficit by 0.6 
percentage point of GDP (see table 3). The cyclical improvement of public finances allowed 
national government borrowing to move away from the excessive deficits threshold. Owing to 
faster than anticipated output growth (see table 4), Member States were able to fulfil the 
objectives of their stability programmes easily. Only Austria and Finland made budgetary 
efforts over that period (see table 5). At the end of 2000, the governments could announce 
that government borrowing would be in balance in 2004, while implementing fiscal reforms 
which were deteriorating public balances in the short-term. In the stability programmes 
presented at the end of 2000, government borrowing was anticipated to be cut by 0.7% of 
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GDP between 2000 and 2003 in the euro area, due to lower interest payments (0.3 percentage 
point) and a positive cyclical effect (1 percentage point). No budgetary effort was planned: 
there even was a positive fiscal impulse of 0.6% of GDP. The procedures of the SGP were 
ineffective in this case, since insufficient ‘efforts’ could not be sanctioned as no distinction 
was made between structural and total deficits.  
Table 3. General government balances in the euro area 
Percentage of GDP 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
General government balance (1) – 2.6 – 2.3 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 1.6 – 2.2 
Cyclical component (2) – 0.9/– 0.4 – 0.6/– 0.1 – 0.3/0.3 0.3/0.9 0.0/0.5 – 0.7/– 0.2
Interest payments 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.8 
(1) Excluding proceeds relative to UMTS licences. (2) OECD Economic Outlook, n° 72, December 2002. Italic numbers are 
those of the Commission, Spring 2003Economic Forecasts. 
Sources: European Commission, OECD. 
Table 4. Euro area GDP growth and general government balances according  
to the stability programmes 
 GDP growth assumptions (%) General government balance (% of GDP) 
 J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 Actual J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 Actual
1998 2.8     2.9 – 2.1 – 1.9    – 2.3 
1999 2.5 2.2    2.8 – 1.7 – 1.4 – 1.2   – 1.3 
2000 2.6 2.8 3.3   3.5 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.8  – 1.0 
2001 2.6 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.5 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 1.6 
2002  2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0 0.9*  – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 2.2 – 2.2* 
2003  2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 1.0*  – 0.2 0.0 – 0.5 – 1.8 – 2.5* 
2004   2.8 2.6 2.6 2.3*   0.4 0.1 – 1.1 – 2.4* 
2005    2.6 2.6     0.3 – 0.6  
2006     2.6      – 0.2  
* European Commission, Spring 2003 Economic Forecasts. 
Sources: European Commission, Stability programmes, OFCE’s calculations. 
 
The European authorities (the ECB, the Commission) deplored that Member States did not 
use the cyclical improvement to bring more rapidly their deficits close to balance. According 
to the Commission, the 1% of GDP government borrowing in the euro area in 2000 amounted 
to 1.7% in structural terms. Despite the fact that the unemployment rate was standing at 8.5% 
the Commission estimates that there was a positive output gap of 1.6% in the euro area. The 
1.7% of GDP budgetary effort needed to bring budgetary positions in balance in 2004 should 
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have been made during the 1997-2000 period, when cyclical conditions were favourable. 
Unfortunately, the existing European procedures could not impose it. The Commission 
blames Member States for having run pro-cyclical expansionary policies in that period. 
But this reasoning was questioned by a second interpretation for three reasons, which 
governments did not dare to publicly express. First, the euro area should not accept to live 
with an unemployment rate of 9.3%, which is the Commission’s estimate of the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. Europe should target an unemployment rate of 5%, which requires output 
growth of at least 3% for the five coming years, instead of 2.3% as the Commission implicitly 
states it. If this objective for unemployment is credible, it means that there was a negative 
output gap of around – 3.5% in 2000 and a cyclically-adjusted budget surplus of 0.7% of 
GDP. No restrictive fiscal policy was therefore needed. Output growth would bring budgetary 
positions in balance. Second, a cyclically-adjusted deficit of 3% of GDP allows the debt level 
to stabilise at 60% of GDP in an economy growing at an annual rate of 5% in nominal terms. 
A deficit of 1.5% of GDP allows for some decline in the debt level ratio. The euro area 
considered as a whole had therefore significant budgetary room for manoeuvre (of around 2 
percentage points). Last, a country with high unemployment and rapid GDP growth without 
inflationary pressures may prefer to see the continuation of this economic cycle for as long as 
possible. The country may decide to undertake necessary fiscal reforms (like tax cuts or lower 
social contributions) rather than endanger growth with the implementation of a restrictive 
fiscal policy, especially as there is no certainty that budgetary efforts will be offset by 
monetary loosening.  
Many euro area economies benefited from exceptional fiscal receipts in 1999 and 2000. These 
countries decided in the course of these years to launch tax cuts programmes which were not 
announced in their stability programmes. Consequently stability programmes appeared to 
provide virtual rather than real commitments. The Commission then started to ask that 
countries shall submit any major policy change to the European authorities. But governments 
wish to keep their capacity of action and reaction.  
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Table 5. Fiscal policies in the euro area 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
General government borrowing, % of GDP 
Germany – 2.0 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 3.1 – 2.4 – 3.3 – 3.4 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 2.8 – 3.8 – 3.3 
France – 2.1 – 2.4 – 4.2 – 6.0 – 5.5 – 5.5 – 4.1 – 3.0 – 2.7 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.5 – 2.7 – 2.9 
Italy – 11.8 – 11.7 – 10.7 – 10.3 – 9.3 – 7.6 – 7.1 – 2.7 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 1.7 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 2.1 
Spain – 4.2 – 4.3 – 4.0 – 6.7 – 6.1 – 6.6 – 4.9 – 3.2 – 2.7 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 
The Netherlands – 5.7 – 3.2 – 4.4 – 3.6 – 4.2 – 4.2 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 0.7  0.4 1.5 0.1 – 0.8 – 0.6 
Belgium – 6.8 – 7.4 – 8.0 – 7.3 – 5.1 – 4.4 – 3.8 – 2.0 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 
Austria – 2.4 – 3.0 – 2.0 – 4.2 – 5.0 – 5.3 – 4.0 – 2.0 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.7 0.0 – 1.6 – 1.4 
Finland 5.3 – 1.1 – 5.7 – 7.3 – 5.7 – 3.7 – 3.2 – 1.5 1.3 1.9 7.0 4.9 3.2 2.9 
Greece – 15.9 – 11.4 – 12.6 – 13.6 – 9.9 – 10.2 – 7.4 – 4.0 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.0 
Portugal – 4.9 – 5.8 – 2.9 – 5.9 – 5.9 – 4.4 – 3.8 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.9 – 3.2 – 4.1 – 3.4 – 3.0 
Ireland – 2.8 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 2.7 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 0.2 1.2 2.4 2.2 4.4 1.7 – 0.5 – 1.3 
Euro area – 4.9 – 5.2 – 5.4 – 5.8 – 5.1 – 5.0 – 4.3 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 2.2 – 2.1 
Fiscal impulses, % of GDP * 
Germany 3.0 0.6 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.4 – 0.5 
France 0.3 – 0.1 1.4 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 2.0 – 0.5 – 0.2  – 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.9 – 0.1 
Italy – 1.1 – 1.7 – 2.4 – 1.7 0.9 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 1.8 1.4 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.0 
Spain 1.0 0.0 – 1.8 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 1.8 – 0.8 0.5 – 0.5 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.4 0.1 
The Netherlands 1.6 – 3.0 0.6 2.0 – 1.2 – 0.6 – 2.2 – 0.3 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.4 
Belgium – 0.9 0.7 0.1 – 2.2 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.8 0.9 0.3 – 0.7 –0.1 0.4 
Austria – 0.4 0.5 – 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.0 – 1.5 – 1.6 1.0 0.1 – 0.4 – 1.5 1.3 – 0.1 
Finland 1.1 1.4 1.1 – 1.7 – 1.5 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 – 1.5 – 0.1 – 2.9 1.0 0.9 0.5 
Greece – 1.3 – 2.5 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 4.8 2.9 – 2.0 – 0.7 – 1.4 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.3 
Portugal 1.1 1.7 – 3.0 2.6 – 0.6 – 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.4 – 1.2 – 1.0 
Ireland 2.0 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.6 1.7 – 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.5 1.7 – 0.8 3.4 1.7 – 0.4 
Euro area 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 1.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.0 0.2 – 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 – 0.1 
* Opposite of the variation of the cyclically-adjusted balance excluding interest payments. A positive number indicates an expansionary policy. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, authors’ calculations. 
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3.2. 2001-2003: the difficult years 
Public deficits rose gradually under the effect of the economic slowdown in 2001 and 2002. 
Fiscal reforms or public spending programmes launched in 2000 also contributed to raise 
public deficits in some countries (Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland). Deficits started to 
rise again in almost all euro area Member States. A discretionary fiscal policy was all the 
more needed to support activity that monetary policy was not very active. There was only a 
slightly positive fiscal impulse in the area. In Germany, where an ambitious fiscal reform had 
been implemented and where the economy was particularly affected by the economic 
slowdown, the public deficit reached 3.8% in 2002. Portugal recognised in 2002 that 
government borrowing had breached the 3% of GDP threshold in 2001 (4.1%). France 
breached the 3% limit in 2002. Italy used creative accounting to keep the deficit at 2.4%.  The 
Commission addressed a recommendation to the Council to launch the excessive deficit 
procedure against Portugal (for year 2001) and Germany (for 2002) and recommended the 
sending of an early warning to France (for 2003) in November 2002. These recommendations 
were adopted by the Council on 21 January 2003. In April 2003, the Commission sent a 
recommendation to the Council to launch the excessive deficit procedure against France (for 
year 2002). 
The updates of the stability programmes presented in late 2001 were still counting on a 
significant economic upturn in 2002. All countries with the exception of France and Ireland 
were maintaining the objective of balanced or in surplus budgets in 2004. Public deficits in 
the euro area were expected to be cut by 1.3 of GDP between 2001 and 2004, with lower 
interest payments contributing to 0.3 percentage point and discretionary measures to 1 
percentage point, output being expected to grow at its potential rate. In other words, 
governments were committing themselves to run restrictive budgetary policies, independently 
of the economic situation. The 2001 stability programmes highlighted the drawbacks of the 
procedures of the SGP. It was not realistic to present a 4-year budgetary programme 
independently of cyclical conditions at the end of 2001. Such programmes can at best set out 
medium-term structural guidelines for public expenditure and receipts. They cannot be 
commitments in terms of future government borrowing.  
In 2002, two alternative views were opposed. According to some governments, in particular 
to the French one, it was essential to support activity and to fulfil electoral promises of tax 
cuts. There is no justification for running a restrictive policy in a period of recession. It would 
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be unpopular, would dampen further activity when there are no inflationary pressures, only to 
conform to the arbitrary ‘diktat’ of Brussels. Besides, not conforming to the commitments 
announced in the stability programme does not entail sanctions. In the view of European 
authorities, the credibility of SGP procedures is weakened by actual deficits well above 
targets presented in the stability programmes and by the fact that some governments refuse to 
introduce corrective measures in order to reach the targets for deficits in 2004. But the 
warnings of the European authorities were inappropriate to the economic situation and 
therefore were hardly listened to. The deficit reached 2.2% of GDP in the euro area in 2002 
instead of the 0.9% anticipated in the stability programmes released early that year (see table 
4).  
At the Barcelona summit of March 2002, governments had reaffirmed the target of 0% of 
GDP deficit for 2004. But this would have required a significant fiscal policy tightening in 
Germany, France, Italy and Portugal in 2003 and 2004 which has no economic justification. 
Under the current practice of the European Council heads of government sign a long 
document prepared by the Commission and the ECF, which deals with a large variety of 
topics and cannot be discussed in detail. This practice is neither efficient nor democratic. It 
cannot bind states, their government and parliament. Governments may be reproached to have 
accepted the introduction of this procedure.  
According the Commission Spring 2003 forecasts, only 3 out of the 12 euro area countries 
will reach close-to-balance or in surplus budgetary positions in 2004: Spain (– 0.1), Belgium 
(– 0.1) and Finland (3.0). The primary deficit increased by 1.2% of GDP from 1997 to 2002 
despite the Commission’s exhortations. European procedures seem to have had little impact 
on national policies. However the deficit is modest in 2002 (2.2% of GDP for the euro area) 
in comparison with past similar circumstances: the deficit had reached 5% of GDP in 1986 
and 4.3% in 1996. According to the Commission, the structural deficit has reached 2% of 
GDP (see table 6). But this is under the assumption of a very low output gap (0.7% of 
potential GDP). Therefore the problem is currently not the widening of public deficits but 
rather that European authorities stay firm on budget targets instead of organising co-ordinated 
economic policies to support activity. 
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Table 6. Cyclically-adjusted balances in 2002 
Percentage of GDP 
European Commission OECD  
Structural Structural 
Primary 
Structural Structural 
Primary 
Austria – 1.6  2.2 – 1.1 1.2 
Belgium 0.2  6.3 0.9 6.5 
Finland 3.7  6.3 4.3 4.9 
France – 2.7  0.5 – 2.5 0.3 
Germany – 3.3 0.0 – 2.7 0.3 
Greece – 1.7 3.9 – 1.3 4.4 
Ireland – 1.4 0.2 – 1.4  – 1.7 
Italy – 1.8 4.0 – 1.6  3.8 
The Netherlands – 0.6 2.7 0.4  3.0 
Portugal – 3.0 0.0 – 2.9 0.2  
Spain  – 0.1 2.8 0.3 3.1 
Euro area – 2.0 1.8 – 1.6 1.8 
Sources: European Commission, Autumn 2002 Economic Forecasts; OECD Economic Outlook n°72. 
 
The 2002 updates of stability programmes predict a negative fiscal impulse of 0.5% of GDP 
each year in 2003 and 2004 and of about 0.3% of GDP each year in 2005 and 2006 in the euro 
area (see table 7). This is particularly worrying as output growth prospects are uncertain for 
these years, especially for 2003. Deficits are expected to shrink from 2.2% of GDP to 0.1% of 
GDP in 2006, with cyclical improvement contributing to 0.35 percentage point only, lower 
interest payments to 0.25 percentage point and budgetary efforts to 1.6. Germany, Portugal, 
Italy and the Netherlands have endorsed significant restrictive budgetary measures in 2003 
(1.3% of GDP for Germany and Portugal, 0.6% of GDP for Italy, 0.4% of GDP for the 
Netherlands), but France has decided to postpone them to 2004. Almost all countries say they 
will reach the close-to-balance target in 2006. However, this is conditional on an annual 3% 
real GDP growth in Italy. Germany anticipates a negative fiscal impulse of 1% of GDP per 
year during four years. The French deficit is expected to remain around 1% of GDP in 2006, 
after three years of negative fiscal impulse of an annual 0.4% of GDP. Outside the area, the 
British government anticipates a deficit of 1.5% of GDP to finance higher public investment 
spending. 
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Table 7. Stability programmes, early 2003 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Real GDP growth, % 
Germany 0.6 0.5 1.5 2.25 2.25 2.25 
France 1.8 1.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Italy 1.8 0.6 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.0 
Spain 2.7 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
The Netherlands 1.3 0.25 0.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 
Belgium 0.8 0.7 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.5* 
Austria 0.7 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.5 2.5 
Finland 0.7 1.6 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 
Portugal 1.7 0.7 1.3 2.7 3.1 3.5 
Greece 4.1 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.6 
Ireland 5.7 4.5 3.5 4.1 5.0 5.0* 
Euro area 1.5 1.0 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.6 
General government balance, % of GDP 
Germany – 2.8 – 3.8 – 2.8 – 1.5 – 1.0 0.0 
France – 1.4 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 1.0 
Italy – 2.2 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.1 
Spain – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
The Netherlands 0.1 – 0.7 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.1 
Belgium 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5* 
Austria 0.3 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 1.5 – 1.1 
Finland 4.9 3.8 2.7 2.1 2.6 2.8 
Portugal – 4.2 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 1.1 – 0.5 
Greece – 1.2 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.4 0.2 0.6 
Ireland 1.6 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.2* 
Euro area – 1.5 – 2.2 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.1 
Fiscal impulse , % of GDP** 
Germany  0.3 – 1.3 – 1.2 – 0.4 – 0.9 
France  0.8 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.5 
Italy  – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Spain  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
The Netherlands  – 0.2 – 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium  0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Austria  0.6 0.6 – 0.5 1.2 – 0.1 
Finland  0.7 1.3 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.1 
Portugal  – 1.8 – 1.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.3 
Greece  0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Ireland  1.6 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.1 
Euro area  0.2 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.4 
* Figures for Belgium and Ireland kept unchanged in 2006 as compared to 2005. * Opposite of the variation of the 
cyclically-adjusted balance excluding interest payments. A positive number indicates an expansionary policy. 
Sources: Stability programmes, Fourth updates, end 2002/early 2003. Own calculations. 
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4. Weaknesses of the existing framework 
The fiscal policy institutional framework of the euro area raises a number of problems. What 
is its objective? If the objective is to avoid that a country generates negative externalities on 
partner countries, then the rules should bear directly on these externalities, on the level of 
domestic inflation or the default risk of public finances. If the objective is economic policy 
co-ordination, then the ECB and the Member States should discuss and define openly the 
policies to be implemented in Europe, taking into consideration the different cyclical 
conditions in Member States. Last, if the objective is to adopt a common economic policy 
then a democratically elected economic government of Europe should be settled.  
4.1. The rationale for the 3% of GDP reference value 
The 3% ceiling is the absolute reference in the current budgetary framework. However, it has 
no economic rationale. The reasons given are awkward. A deficit of 3% of GDP would 
stabilise the debt level at 60% of GDP under a nominal GDP growth of 5%. But in that case 
the reference should apply to the cyclically-adjusted balance or to the average balance over an 
economic cycle. The 3% figure would be close to the share of public investment in the EU 
GDP. But, there again, the reasoning can apply only to cyclically-adjusted deficits. The level 
of the deficit would need to be compared to the level of public investment, so that a country 
implementing public investment programmes would be entitled to a higher deficit. Last, the 
ratio of net investment to GDP, net investment being the relevant variable in that case, stands 
only around 1.5% on average.  
A country hit by a specific shock and falling into recession may need a higher than 3% of 
GDP deficit to compensate for the fall in domestic private demand. A priori, this does not 
raise inflation in the area. Such a deficit could even benefit partner countries since it will 
avoid the fall in domestic demand which would otherwise have a negative impact on partner 
countries. In 2002, the public deficit reached 3.8% of GDP in Germany, but inflation was low 
(1.4%) and the current account was in surplus (1.9% of GDP). It is difficult to claim that the 
German public deficit generates negative spill-over effects in the rest of the area. If there was 
to be a negative externality, it would rather be the fact that the low level of demand impedes 
partners’ exports to Germany and thereby has a negative impact on GDP growth in these 
countries. Conversely, the current procedures do not prevent a specific country from having 
an excessively high inflation, which will induce excessively high interest rates and may in 
Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Breaking the Ice 
 - 15 -
practice have a negative impact on partner countries. Inflation was growing at an annual rate 
of 5.1% in the Netherlands in 2001 while government borrowing was in balance.  
In the past, the 3% of GDP figure has been breached quite often in the industrial world. This 
occurred in the US in 1975, 1976, and from 1982 to 1995, in Japan from 1978 to 1980 and 
since 1995; in Germany, in 1975, 1976, 1981, 1982, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996; in France in 
1985, 1986 and from 1992 to 1997 (see Chart 1). Public deficits were then judged necessary 
to support activity. It could be different now only if monetary policy was more growth-
oriented than in the past. But this is not the ECB remit. Anyhow, with a single monetary 
policy and different national cyclical positions, monetary policy cannot react to a country-
specific cyclical slowdown (see table 8). Hence euro area countries should be given larger 
budgetary room for manoeuvre, since they can no more use the exchange rate and interest 
rates. 
 
Chart 1. General government net lending 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook, excluding proceeds relative to UMTS licences in the euro area. 
 
The absolute 3% of GDP limit places governments before the following alternative: either 
they bring the cyclically-adjusted deficit down to zero, so that some ‘cyclical room for 
manoeuvre’ becomes available; or they maintain some cyclically-adjusted deficit thereby 
loosing any cyclical room for manoeuvre. Some authors (Artis and Buti, 2001, or Barrell, 
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2001) evaluate the level of the structural deficit needed in each country to prevent public 
deficits from rising above 3% of GDP in downturns. But such structural deficits estimates are 
not optimal, since they are conditional on the arbitrary 3% ceiling. There is no certainty that a 
single interest rate will lead such levels of public deficits to be equilibrium ones for each 
country, independently of the strength of domestic private demand. 
Norms for public deficits do not necessarily imply that countries will fulfil the inflation target. 
A country with buoyant private demand may have both high inflation and a fiscal surplus. 
Such norms restrict the possibility for countries to run countercyclical fiscal policies. Each 
country of the area will face falls in domestic production if demand or inflation are high in 
partner countries (see box 2). Conversely, the fiscal policy needed to stabilise domestic 
demand levels and to keep inflation under control, is such that a country operating at below 
capacity should be entitled to run some public deficit whereas countries in a better cyclical 
position should run some budget surplus. 
 
Table 8. Interest rates, GDP growth and inflation forecasts for 2003, January 2003 
 GDP growth,  
% 
Consumer 
prices, %  
Differential (1) Output gap Interest rate 
target (2) 
Germany 0.9 1.2 0.7 – 2.1 1.75 
Austria 1.7 1.7 – 0.6 – 1.4 3.6 
Belgium 1.6 1.6 – 0.4 – 0.8 3.55 
Spain 2.5 3.1 – 2.8 – 0.7 6.55 
Finland 2.6 1.9 – 1.7 – 1.8 4.2 
France 1.6 1.7 – 0.5 – 0.6 3.8 
Greece 3.6 3.3 – 4.1 0.8 7.6 
Ireland 3.6 4.5 – 5.3 5.0 12.5 
Italy 1.4 2.1 – 0.7 – 1.6 3.6 
The Netherlands 1.0 2.5 – 0.8 – 1.8 5.1 
Portugal 1.4 2.8 – 1.4 – 1.3 4.55 
Euro area 1.4 1.7 – 0.3 – 1.3 3.45 
(1) Differential between the short-term interest rate (2.75%) and consumer price inflation plus real GDP growth forecasts for 
2003 (as of January 2003). 
(2) Defined as 0.5( 1.5) 0.5( )r g y yπ π= + + − + −  where g: potential output growth, π: inflation rate and ( )y y− : OECD’s 
output gap.  
Sources: Consensus Economics, OECD Economic Outlook, n° 72, December 2002, own calculations. 
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Box 2. Stabilisation policies and fiscal rules  
There is no evidence that different countries having the same interest rate may and should 
implement the same fiscal policy. Let us consider the model presented in box 1. In order to 
reach the single inflation target, each country has to target a level of output such as: 
0 /i iy π α= − . The central bank, considering the aggregated situation of the area, will set the 
interest rate as: 0( / ) /i ir d nπ α σ= Σ + Σ ; i.e. at the level which allows reaching the inflation target 
with government budget in balance (n being the number of countries assumed to be of similar 
size). It follows that each country should be allowed to run a public deficit of: 
0 0/ ( / ) /i i i i ig d d nπ α π α= − − + Σ + Σ . National deficits will differ so as to take account of different 
national cyclical positions and to equalise inflation rates. Ex post the level of output in each 
country will depend only of domestic factors. 
Conversely, let us assume that each country is requested to keep its deficit at 0ig = . Under the 
Central bank’s interest rate rule, domestic outputs levels are: 0( / ) /i i i iy d d nπ α= − Σ + Σ . These 
levels do not allow each country to reach the inflation target. Each country can only let 
domestic output fluctuations depend on domestic demand and will therefore run a sub-optimal 
policy. Each country is negatively affected by rising demand or inflation in partner countries. 
 
4.2. The rationale for medium-term budgetary positions in balance 
The rationale for a medium-term balanced budget has no clear economic justification either. 
A country where private savings are spontaneously too low (high) may need some budget 
surplus (deficit). It is also reasonable to finance public investment through government 
borrowing and therefore some public deficit may be justified. The justification given by the 
Commission is that budgetary positions in balance will allow policies to react to normal 
cyclical fluctuations without breaching the 3% of GDP limit (itself arbitrary). 
In a situation of relatively low private demand, running a government budget in balance may 
require such a low level of interest rate that the objective will be out of reach. From 1970 to 
2002, the budget was in surplus in the US only from 1998 to 2000 (3 years over 33); in the 
UK in 1970, 1971, 1988, 1989 and from 1998 to 2001 (8 years over 33). This never happened 
in the euro area;6 in Germany in 1970, 1973, 1989 (3 years over 33), in France from 1970 to 
1974, in 1977 (6 years over 33). The Pact intends to impose as a permanent reference a 
                                                 
6 Except in 2000, when a slight surplus of 0.1% of GDP was artificially reached owing to proceeds relative to 
UMTS licences. 
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situation which occurred only rarely in the past. 
A deficit kept in permanence at 0% of GDP would lead nominal public debt to be stable and 
constantly declining as a percentage of GDP. The debt would reach 0% of GDP at some point. 
But savers, in particular pension funds, need to own public assets, which are long-term, liquid 
and safe assets. If savers wish to own financial assets while private companies are reluctant to 
increase borrowing, a 0% of GDP public deficit and debt may require low long-term interest 
rates, below GDP growth, which would not be optimal. If households wish to own more 
bonds and firms are reluctant to borrow, a country which controls the domestic interest rate 
may cut it in order to match supply and demand. On the contrary, in a country which does not 
control interest rates, higher public deficits and debts are needed. Paradoxically, the 
independence of the central bank is a major cause for higher public deficits (Creel and 
Sterdyniak, 1995). A more reasonable medium-term objective would be the stability of a debt 
to GDP ratio at 40% for instance. This would require a cyclically-adjusted deficit of less than 
1.8% of GDP, with nominal GDP rising by 4.5% a year, which represents a budgetary effort 
significantly lower than requested by the Commission.  
4.3. The SGP and economic policy co-ordination 
The justifications for the Stability Pact combine reasonably sound considerations on the need 
to avoid the negative externalities that a given national fiscal policy could have on partner 
economies, and more arguable considerations on the inefficiency of discretionary fiscal 
policies, on the expansionary bias and on the risk of non sustainable fiscal policies run by 
democratically elected governments. 
The procedure of the stability programmes implies that governments are able to make reliable 
forecasts on a 4-year horizon, and to commit themselves to implementing a fiscal policy in 
line with this projection. Governments are likely to be tempted to present an optimistic 
forecast, showing strong and sustained output growth bringing government borrowing in 
balance in a four-year time. But what shall be done if GDP growth turns out to be lower than 
forecast? If a depressive shock occurs, should countries keep their fiscal policy stance 
unchanged? Should they stick to the forecasted deficits (meaning in practice tightening their 
policies) or should they rather maintain announced public spending and taxation (meaning 
accepting rising deficits)? Forecasting economic activity without errors is impossible in 
practice, even on a 1-year horizon. Hence one cannot expect stability programmes to give an 
exact image of the future. The procedure of an annual submission of stability programmes 
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generates permanent tensions between governments wishing to keep the possibility to adapt 
fiscal policy to the current circumstances and the Commission claiming for a strict fulfilment 
of the stability programmes.  
Fortunately, the horizon for budgetary positions to be in balance is a medium term one. This 
could have left room for a soft interpretation of the provisions of the Pact, where the medium 
run target would have been indicative. The objective started to be more binding when a given 
year was chosen for government borrowing to be in balance (2002, then 2004, then 2006) 
independently of the cyclical situation. 
If the procedure was strictly followed, it would put a strong constraint on fiscal policy in the 
countries where fiscal deficits remain. For example, general government borrowing reached 
3.1% of GDP in France in 2002. If the French government wants to fulfil the commitment 
made in Seville in 2002 to reach a budgetary position in balance in 2004, the public deficit 
will have to be cut by 1.5% of GDP both in 2003 and in 2004. This means a restrictive policy 
will have to be run these two years, independently of the economic situation. The lower 
output growth, the strongest the budgetary effort. Fiscal policy is necessarily pro-cyclical in 
the path towards equilibrium.  
In theory, stability programmes put strong constraints on fiscal policies. In practice, coalitions 
have happened to emerge in the Council not to vote the recommendations from the 
Commission (it should be noted that the state concerned takes part to the vote). Moreover, 
Member States are not compelled to follow the recommendation as long as their deficit 
remains below 3% of GDP. This is the ‘bad example’ shown first by Portugal and Germany in 
February 2002, to avoid the adoption of a warning against the risk of an excessive deficit 
recommended by the Commission. These two countries have however committed themselves 
to run restrictive fiscal policies in order to bring their budgetary position in balance in 2004. 
France did worse in September 2002 when the government refused to present a stability 
programme showing a budgetary position in balance in 2004, and not even in 2006. 
The Commission does not want to set a target of economic growth in Europe and to define a 
strategy to reach it. The procedure is not economic policy co-ordination. Monetary authorities 
do not take part in the process. The cyclical position of the European economy, global or 
country-specific, is only partly taken into consideration. National stability programmes are 
evaluated separately, without analysing the impact they will have on partner countries. With 
the view that automatic stabilisers may be allowed to run only in countries where budgetary 
positions are in balance, whereas efforts should be intensified in the countries where it is not 
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the case, it is difficult anyway to see what co-ordination the Commission could organise. 
The Pact focuses on public finance targets and not on output growth targets. It is therefore not 
a co-ordination process, but a forced convergence toward a priori defined norms. A 
satisfactory co-ordination process would consist in examining precisely the economic 
situation of the area as a whole in terms of inflation and output growth in order to set the 
appropriate level of interest rates, before analysing the compared national situations into 
detail so as to set the adequate national fiscal policies (see box 3).  
 
Box 3. An illustrative example of co-ordination 
Six countries of the same size are assumed to form the area (see table). The ex ante demand 
level is shown in column 1; the level of inflation is shown in column 2 (both being expressed in 
difference from the objective). The strategy chosen in the example is that any gap between 
actual inflation and the objective level should be reduced by 50% during the reference period. 
The desirable situation may then be calculated (columns 3 and 4). The average impulse needed 
in terms of output is + 0.5. This impulse is provided by monetary policy (column 5). The fiscal 
policy reaction adapted to each domestic situation is shown in column 6. In this example, 
countries A, C and D must run an expansionary fiscal policy. Countries B and F where inflation 
is too high need to run a restrictive fiscal policy and to accept a negative output gap. 
Table. An example of economic policy co-ordination 
Initial situation Targeted situation Impulse  
Demand Inflation Output Inflation Monetary* Fiscal 
A – 2 0 0 0 0.5 1.5 
B – 1 2 – 1 1 0.5 – 0.5 
C – 1 – 1 0.5 – 0.5 0.5 1.0 
D – 1 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
E 0 – 1 0.5 – 0.5 0.5 0.0 
F 1.5 1 – 0.5 0.5 0.5 – 2.5 
* Monetary policy: r =– 0.5  
Note: In each country, production is determined by: i i iy d g r= + − ; inflation by: 0i i iyπ π= +  
 
4.4. The limits of the BEPGs  
The procedure of BEPGs is not much reported in the press and in the public opinion. How 
could Member States accept to bind their policies to comply with decisions made by 
technocratic committees without any democratic debate?  
The last BEPGs, published in June 2002, do not organise an adequate fiscal policy answer to 
the economic downturn. The BEPGs refer mainly to structural policies. In line with the 
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Lisbon strategy objectives, they focus on the main challenge of ‘making Europe the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by the year 2010’. They tell once more 
the importance of monetary policy targeting price stability and of ‘sound’ fiscal policies. 
They focus more on the need to cut deficits than to support activity: the objective remains to 
improve public finance today so as to be able to use macroeconomic stabilisation in the 
future. The BEPGs reassert the medium-term strategy: budgetary positions in balance starting 
from 2004 and in surplus in the medium term in the prospect of ageing populations. On 
structural issues, the BEPGs advocate in permanence for lower tax to GDP ratios and lower 
public expenditure as a share of GDP. In our view this should remain a national choice: each 
country is free to choose the organisation of its retirement, health or education systems.  
National fiscal policies are under the control of three Community procedures suffering 
questionable economic rationale and dubious democratic legitimacy. The European 
Commission has set a four pillar strategy and tries to impose it on Member States: the 3% 
limit, the medium-term budgetary position in balance, cuts in public spending and disapproval 
of discretionary fiscal policies. The institutional functioning is such that the public finance 
criteria, like the 3% of GDP threshold and the medium-term targets for deficits become 
objectives as such: the European authorities urge countries to fulfil these objectives, 
independently of any economic rationale. A deficit higher than 3% of GDP in one country 
becomes harmful, not because of negative spillovers, but because it endangers the credibility 
of the Commission’s surveillance process. But imposing constraints of supplementary and 
arbitrary objectives can only impede European countries’ ability to support satisfying growth 
(Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2002). 
5. The reforms proposed by the Commission 
In July 2001, on a proposal from the EFC, the Ecofin Council adopted the first reform of the 
procedures (European Commission, 2002a). The objective is to provide a ‘more effective 
surveillance’. Countries shall present their annual stability programme before 1 December. 
The assumptions for the world economy outside the European Union shall be provided by the 
Commission. Domestic policies have to be in line with the BEPGs. The medium-term target 
must fulfil the rule of balanced budgets. But it also has to enable a rapid decline in the debt to 
GDP ratio and to provide room for manoeuvre for future ageing-related expenditure. The 
stability programmes will have to incorporate a projection of the impact of ageing populations 
on public finance sustainability. Member States will be asked to commit themselves to 
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undertake in the course of the year the correcting measures necessary to reach the targets set 
in their plans. The assessment of the medium-term objective of budgetary positions in balance 
will have to take account of the cyclically-adjusted balances as they are estimated by the 
Commission. However, these cyclically-adjusted balances will not become an objective as 
such: ‘The Pact will not change’. Member States have to bring government borrowing in 
balance and then to maintain an underlying budgetary position in balance or in surplus.  
The reference to ageing populations is a way of putting permanent pressure on countries so 
that they reduce the burden of old-age pensions public spending or run budget surpluses to 
guarantee the future funding of pensions. But no country intends to finance the future rise in 
pension spending through a permanent public deficit, which would be impossible anyway. If a 
country is willing to finance the future increase in social expenditure through higher social 
contributions, there will be no impact on partner countries. One may regret that governments 
have let the Commission introduce the pensions issue in the stability programmes. Besides it 
is difficult to imagine how countries can fulfil the objectives of their programmes when GDP 
growth turns out to be much lower than expected. Should pro-cyclical policies be run? This 
text increases the power of the European authorities and was adopted by the Ecofin council 
without any public and open debate.  
The Commission has requested in February 2002 that each country necessarily asks the 
opinion of the Commission and of the peer countries before making important economic 
policy decisions. The risk is that any unorthodox change of policy will be opposed. 
On 13 September 2002, speaking before the European Convention, Pedro Solbes, 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, stated that the functioning of the EMU 
was satisfactory. However he proposed three reforms. First, the Commission should be 
entitled to send recommendations directly to the States without any approval from the 
Council. Second, the Council shall not depart from the Commission’s recommendations on 
BEPGs and on warnings addressed to a member country, unless acting by unanimity. Last, a 
Member State concerned should not take part to the vote on warning. Pedro Solbes also 
proposed the creation of an ‘Ecofin Council for the euro area’, which would prevent Member 
States outside the monetary union from voting on constraints they are not subject to.  
On 24 September, the Commission (Solbes, 2002) recognised officially that the target of 
close-to-balance budget was out of reach for 2004, even in terms of cyclically-adjusted 
balance. The government deficit of the euro area was to reach at least 2% in 2002, instead of 
0.9% expected at the end of 2001. Four countries (Portugal, Germany, France and Italy) were 
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accused of having undertaken too expansionary fiscal policies in times of economic growth. 
The Commission proposed to change the rules of the game to avoid such deviations. But the 
Commission does no intend to put the Stability Pact into question: ‘The experience of the 
early years shows that the question is not about the framework itself, but how can the system 
be better managed so that the rules are followed. The 3% of GDP deficit threshold is the 
cornerstone of our stability framework.’ The medium-term target remains close-to-balance or 
in surplus budgets on average over the cycle. This target cannot be postponed in permanence, 
or it will loose credibility. The Commission now accepts reasoning in terms of cyclically-
adjusted balances. The Commission accepts that the four ‘sinners’ of the euro area commit no 
more themselves to reach close-to-balance budgets in 200, under the condition that they will 
cut structural deficits by at least 0.5% of GDP a year, so that all structural government 
budgets will be close to balance in 2006. Once this objective is reached, Member States will 
have to maintain their structural budget at least in balance. Pedro Solbes reasserts the 
necessity to strengthen fiscal policy co-ordination, but within the Stability Pact. This closes 
the door on any further discussion. The fulfilment of an a priori government budget target 
cannot be itself an effective co-ordination process  
The amendments proposed by the Commission give some room for manoeuvre to the 
countries currently facing economic difficulties. But it does not solve the problems. Who 
could say, at the end of 2002, under uncertain cyclical developments, if the optimal economic 
policy was compatible with an annual 0.5% of GDP reduction in structural deficits? Such a 
policy makes sense only if interest rates are low and if private demand is robust. But as long 
as private demand remains weak, fiscal policy should support activity. The rule prescribed by 
the Commission would deprive national fiscal policies of any room for manoeuvre. However, 
the proposal was accepted by all countries, with the notable exception of France, the ‘non-
reformed sinner’.  
On 18 October 2002, the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, said: ‘I 
know very well that the Stability Pact is stupid, like all decisions that are rigid’.7 Romano 
Prodi proposed in a speech before the European Parliament (A stronger, better Stability and 
Growth Pact, 21 October) that economic policy co-ordination should be in the hands of a 
‘strong authority’ which ‘can both apply the rules strictly to prevent behaviour that is off-
                                                 
7 “Je sais très bien que le Pacte de stabilité est stupide, comme toutes les décisions qui sont rigides”, Le Monde, 
18 October 2002. 
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course and adapt the rules to changing circumstances’. He also said that ‘by its very nature, 
the Commission is therefore naturally suited to this steering role’.  
On 21 November 2002, the Commission (2002b) presented a set of measures to ‘strengthen 
the co-ordination of budgetary policies’. These measures aim at strengthening the control of 
the Commission on national fiscal policies. The Commission deplores that some Member 
States wish to keep their fiscal autonomy and refuse ‘to acknowledge the implication of EMU 
on the conduct of fiscal policy at national level’. The Commission made five proposals (1-5) 
and a presented a four-point programme (6-9): 
1) The ‘close-to-balance or in surplus’ requirement of the SGP should be interpreted in terms 
of cyclically-adjusted budget balances, as estimated by the Commission. 
2) National structural deficits will have to be cut by at least 0.5% of GDP per year, even more 
rapidly in countries having a high deficit or debt, or ‘favourable growth conditions’. These 
countries have to undertake restrictive fiscal policies, independently of the evolution of their 
economic cycle.8 Once the close-to-balance or in surplus requirement is reached, automatic 
stabilisers will be allowed to run but expansionary discretionary budgetary policies will not.  
3) To avoid the occurrence of expansionary fiscal policies in times of favourable growth, 
countries must run budget surpluses when they have a positive output gap. But who will 
decide that a country has a positive output gap? As soon as a country will enjoy some 
economic recovery, the Commission will find a positive output gap, as was the case for 
France from 1999 to 2001, and the country concerned will be asked to implement a restrictive 
fiscal policy.  
4) The Commission wishes to give its authorisation for a ‘small temporary deterioration in the 
underlying budget position’ to the countries which undertake structural reforms in line with 
the Lisbon strategy. But these countries must have a debt well below 60% of GDP and a low 
level of implicit debt on public pensions; they must keep a safety margin to avoid breaching 
the 3% reference value, etc. Member States are seen as irresponsible, they must ask for an 
authorisation before acting. This rule is perfectly well adapted to facilitate the British 
participation in EMU. It does not change the situation for Germany, Italy or France. 9 
                                                 
8 Authors’ comments in italics. 
9 This Commission’s proposal was subject to criticisms from the Economic and Financial Committee, which 
sees in it a risk of budgetary leniency (unpublished report, 12 February 2003). There was no unanimity either 
among Member States on the proposal at the Ecofin Council of 18 February 2003. 
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5) ‘The sustainability of public finances should become a core policy objective’. The 
Commission wants to give more importance to the debt criterion of the excessive deficit 
procedure. Countries with debts well above 60% of GDP will have to present debt reduction 
strategy in their stability programme. But why countries with a high savings rate should be 
prevented from having a certain level public debt? Is Belgium public debt worrying when 
Belgium has a huge external surplus and low inflation? Is the sustainability of public finances 
more important than subdued activity and persistent high unemployment rates? Is the 
sustainability of public finances really at risk in any of the euro area countries? Countries 
should present each year a programme saying how they intend to face the ‘challenge posed by 
ageing populations’. 
6) ‘Member States should reaffirm their political commitments to the SGP’. They should 
endorse a resolution to strengthen fiscal policy co-ordination, including in particular the 
commitment to cut structural deficits by at least 0.5% of GDP a year, to reduce significantly 
debt levels when these are higher than 60% of GDP, to facilitate the implementation of the 
enforcement procedures of the Pact.  
7) The Commission wants to take account of the ‘quality of the public finances’. The 
Commission wants to make sure that countries will reduce government borrowing through 
expenditure cuts and not through higher taxation, and that public spending will be productive. 
The Commission intends to strengthen its surveillance of Member States, to carry out country 
studies and to make them public. But has the Commission been given the role of evaluating 
the size and the appropriateness of national public spending? In our view public spending is 
a political choice and must reflect the democratic choices of citizens. 
8) The Commission wants ‘more effective enforcement procedures’ of the Pact. The 
Commission wants the early-warning mechanism to be activated more rapidly and more 
automatically. It wants warnings to be possibly sent to the countries undertaking 
expansionary policies in good times. It wants the excessive deficit procedure to be possibly 
launched against countries where insufficient efforts to bring public debts below 60% of GDP 
are made. The Commission wants to issue early-warnings to Member States without a 
Council’s vote.  
9) The Commission wants to have ‘a better communication through openness and 
transparency’. Hence the Commission will publish a report presenting an assessment of 
national budgetary developments and general orientations of fiscal policies. This report will 
appear in July each year in the Quarterly report on the euro area. Member States will have 
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take account of the Commission’s report in the preparation of their budgets.  
The Commission has finally accepted that the assessment of the medium-term target (but not 
the 3% of GDP limit) will be made in terms of cyclically-adjusted budget balance. But the 
structural balance is difficult to estimate, since it depends on the calculation of the output gap 
and therefore of potential output. The method used by the Commission (Denis, Mc Morrow 
and Röger, 2002) consists in estimating potential output with a production function. Capital is 
taken as exogenous: in economic slowdowns, capital growth decelerates which, under the 
method used here, lowers potential output. Labour force is measured as the product of the 
population of working age, the participation rate and the complement to one of the non 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). The participation rate is also 
considered as exogenous, whereas it fluctuates in fact in line with the economic situation: a 
rise in unemployment discourages a part of potentially active workers to search for a job. 
Last, the NAIRU is measured as a moving average of the actual unemployment rate. Hence 
potential output growth measured that way tends to reproduce past growth: potential output is 
estimated to have grown by an annual 2.1% in 1981-1982, 2.8% in 1989-1990, 2% in 1993-
1994 and 2.5% in 2000-2001 in the euro area. Potential output fluctuates like actual output. 
The method underestimates the output gap in times of recession and therefore overestimates 
the structural deficit. Past slow growth will necessarily have an impact on current potential 
output. For instance, the Commission estimated that there was a positive output gap of 0.3% 
in France in 2002 despite an unemployment rate of 8.7% (Spring 2003 Economic Forecasts). 
If output growth were stronger than 2.3% a year in 2003-2004 in France, the Commission 
would call for a restrictive policy to be implemented.  
Reasoning in terms of cyclically-adjusted deficits leaves room for automatic stabilisers to 
work: in bad times public deficits may rise under the effect of lower fiscal receipts induced by 
weaker activity. A country will not be asked to raise taxes in times of recession. The problem 
is that fiscal policy should not go beyond automatic stabilisers in the Commission’s view. 
This has no economic rationale. If fiscal policy is thought to be totally ineffective, because as 
households are Ricardian they will anticipate future tax rises, then any attempt to run an 
expansionary policy will fail to boost activity. There will be no rise in inflation and no 
negative impact on partner countries. In that case co-ordination is useless. If, on the contrary, 
fiscal policy is thought to have an effect on activity, then fiscal policy co-ordination is useful 
and there is no reason why fiscal policy should be limited to automatic stabilisers. 
Discretionary fiscal policy may be useful to strengthen or to reduce the effects of automatic 
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stabilisers. If a given country is hit by an adverse demand shock, the single monetary policy 
will not be very proactive. A positive fiscal impulse will be needed in order to stabilise 
domestic output (see box 4). The US government has deliberately run a discretionary fiscal 
policy to boost activity in 2002 and 2003, which adds to the expansionary monetary policy 
stance. There is no reason why such polices should be forbidden in Europe. Last, the size of 
automatic stabilisers varies according to the budget structure (level of the tax to GDP ratio 
and tax rate progression, weight of unemployment allowances), which is a priori unrelated to 
stabilisation needs.  
 
 
Box 4. How to stabilise output, government borrowing and public debt:  
some simple arithmetic 
Let us consider a simple model: (1 )y g d c t y= + + − ; where g is a public spending shock, d a 
private spending shock, c: propensity to consume (considered equal to 0.5), t: tax rate, 
considered equal to 0.5. The GDP level is 100; ρ, the debt to GDP ratio, is 50.  
A fall in private spending (column 1) will lead to a rise in the public deficit and in the debt to 
GDP ratio ex post despite the effect of automatic stabilisers. A rise in public expenditure 
(column 2), hence of the so-called structural deficit, is necessary to stabilise fully activity. 
Trying to stabilise government borrowing (column 3) induces a large fall in activity. Moreover, 
cuts in public expenditure lead to a rise in the debt to GDP ratio because of the fall in activity. It 
is therefore impossible to bring the debt to GDP ratio down to its initial level through lower 
public spending. This is true when (1 )(1 )c tρ > − − . 
 
Impact of a fall in private demand 
d = – 1 g = 0 g = 1 g = – 2 
Y – 1.33% 0 – 4% 
Government borrowing – 0.66 – 1 0 
Debt to GDP ratio, in 
% 
51.3 51 52.1 
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The Commission’s view reflects its suspicions of national governments. European institutions 
are dominated by a Community, Technocratic and Liberal ideology. There are no open and 
transparent choices at the European level between different political options, as should be the 
case in a democracy. A unique solution is proposed and progressively imposed on all 
countries. European institutions represent the interest of the European Community. National 
authorities are selfish and short-sighted. Governments are by nature demagogic since they 
want to be re-elected. It is necessary to transfer as many decisions as possible from the 
national to the community level, from the political to the technocratic level. In this respect, 
the model is the ECB. The institutional logic is such that the Commission has the objective ‘to 
improve European integration’, hence to increase its authority at the detriment of the Member 
States. The Commission’s proposals on fiscal policy co-ordination are part of this deviation 
Why do national authorities accept this deviation? Because the majority of national 
technocracies and of political and economic leaders share the CTL ideology. They believe 
important decisions should be made by technocrats; that nations are no more a relevant level 
in a global world; that European construction is the last chance for rigid social-democrat 
societies to move towards more liberal societies. This common view explains how Brussels 
technocracy can strengthen gradually its power on national issues. 
The Commission tries to deprive national governments of any degree of freedom, without 
implementing an effective economic policy co-ordination in return. This necessarily generates 
tensions in Europe when the Commission’s requirements depart too much from needed 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies as was the case in 2002.  
In early 2003, the Commission wants to have more power on the definition and control of 
national public finances. But these powers are not in the Treaty and have no democratic 
legitimacy. The Commission focuses on the levels of public deficits and debts at the expense 
of unemployment targets or growth prospects. The Commission gives no evidence that the 
restrictive fiscal policies to be undertaken in France, Germany and Italy in 2003 and 2004 will 
be favourable to economic growth in Europe. Is it reasonable to give more powers to the non-
democratically elected Commission? We do not think so and we hope that Members States 
will not follow the Commission. As Paul de Grauwe wrote: ‘Seen from this political 
perspective, the Stability Pact is a vote of no confidence of the European authorities in the 
strength of the democratic institutions in the member countries. It is quite surprising that EU-
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countries have allowed this to happen, and that they have accepted to be subjected to control 
by the European institutions that even the IMF does not impose on banana republics.’10 
At the Eurogroup meeting and Ecofin Council of 18 February 2003, no Member State argued 
clearly against the Commission’s proposals for an in-depth re-examination of the SGP. The 
only interrogations came from some Member States worried that allowing for small 
deviations of the medium-term balance rule would weaken the SGP. Belgium, Denmark and 
Spain voted against the approval of the UK convergence programme, which predicts a 
structural deficit in 2006, even though this deficit is forecast to remain below net public 
investment. Thus Pedro Solbes could say at the Eurogroup Press conference of 18 February 
2003: ‘There is enough flexibility in our rules. (…) It is time that we bring the long debate on 
the future of the Stability and Growth Pact to an end’. 
The Ecofin Council of 7 March 2003 and the European Council of 20-21 March have finally 
adopted a proposal very close to the Commission’s proposal: the 3% of GDP threshold is to 
be considered in terms of actual deficits, the medium-term target in underlying terms. 
Countries having a structural deficit will have to cut it by at least 0.5% of GDP a year. 
Countries with favourable growth conditions will have to avoid procyclical policies. The 
excessive deficit procedure will have to check that debt to GDP ratios are declining 
sufficiently rapidly in highly indebted countries. Quality of public finances and long-term 
sustainability (in the prospect of ageing populations) will be taken into account. This decision 
was adopted without public debate on the respective roles of European and national 
institutions, on a fiscal policy framework based on fiscal targets and not on output growth 
targets. 
6. Reforms suggested by academics 
The need to reform the SGP has generated a growing literature. We will discuss here recent 
proposals. Some proposals call for in-depth changes of the economic policy framework. Some 
others suggest the rules to be changed. Some others call for a change of the procedures. 
6.1. Budgetary federalism 
The European budget represents only 1.27% of GDP. Spending is dedicated mainly to 
                                                 
10 Financial Times, 22 July 2002. 
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common agriculture policy and structural funds. The European budget is not expected to 
increase and cannot be used for short-term stabilisation purposes. So some economists have 
proposed to create a budgetary mechanism of ‘cyclical’ transfers between states (see for 
instance Sala-I-Martin and Sachs (1992), Bureau and Champsaur (1992), Italianer and Pisani-
Ferry (1992), Mélitz (1993), Bayoumi and Masson (1995)). Monetary policy would be in 
charge of the stabilisation policy of the area as a whole; countries would have to run budgets 
in balance; budgetary transfers from countries in a relatively good cyclical position to 
countries in a relatively bad cyclical position would stabilise national macroeconomic 
situations. This organisation has the advantage of cohesion. However, it has never been 
implemented and has not even been seriously discussed officially. On the one hand, it gives 
excessive importance to monetary policy. On the other hand, countries would loose fiscal 
autonomy and would not be allowed to let automatic stabilisers play. A country in recession 
would be allowed to run a deficit within the bounds of transfers received from partner 
countries. Moreover, transfers would be centralised at the community level, which would 
raise difficult issues on the calculation and time schedule of transfers. A country in difficulty 
would be expected to receive transfers from its partners, but the latter could accuse the former 
of being responsible for the difficulty (for instance by maintaining excessively high wages). A 
country enjoying rapid growth would be asked to pay a high contribution, which it might find 
unfair if this rapid growth results from specific domestic efforts (in terms of savings, wages or 
reforms). Transfers setting would lead to never-ending debates. Therefore, the proposal does 
not seem easy to implement. 
6.2. Cyclically-adjusted balance 
It has been widely advocated by economists that fiscal rules should refer to cyclically-
adjusted borrowing. Despite initial ambiguities, the Commission has recognised since 2002 
that the medium-term target of budgetary positions in balance should be understood in terms 
of cyclically-adjusted deficits. Contrary to what happened in the selection process of the first 
members of the monetary union in 1997, countries are not requested to make efforts in order 
to reach a 0% of GDP deficit in a given year. Yet four issues remain open. If a deep economic 
recession occurs in the reference year, countries should be allowed to run some discretionary 
cyclical deficit (to draw on a terminology from Creel and Sterdyniak, 1995) resulting from 
temporary stabilisation measures. We have already seen that it is difficult to calculate 
cyclically-adjusted government borrowing. The reference of a 0% of GDP structural balance 
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remains arbitrary. Last, the 3% of GDP threshold still apply to actual government borrowing.  
Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) suggest that each country shall be compelled to keep public 
spending in year t at the level of fiscal receipts which would be generated by potential output 
of year t. At the end of year t-1, a committee of experts would verify that budget for year t 
complies with the rule. During year t, the country would have to stick to its spending and tax 
rates plans. This procedure would replace the 3% of GDP threshold. Structural borrowing 
would necessarily be zero. The four problems previously mentioned also arise here.  
6.3. The golden rule for public finances 
A large number of economists have shown that it is desirable in economic terms that public 
investment, which will be used over several years, be financed over a similar period of time.11 
Independently of any short-term stabilisation consideration, government budgets should be 
split into a current budget which should be in balance and where spending would include 
public capital stock depreciation, and an investment budget, which will have to be financed 
through borrowing. The UK government adopted such a rule, the so-called ‘golden rule for 
public finances’, in 1998.  
In recent years, several economists (Modigliani et al., 1998, Creel et al., 2002, among others) 
have proposed to import this rule in the euro area: structural current government borrowing, 
i.e. excluding public investment, should be permanently in balance or in surplus. Their 
proposal differs in two respects from the British rule. In the UK, ‘over the economic cycle, 
the Government will borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending’, meaning the 
current budget has to be in balance over a cycle. Hence, the British government accepts to see 
government borrowing rise under the effects of both automatic stabilisers and discretionary 
measures in times of economic recession as long as this rise will be offset by surpluses in 
good times. This is not the case in the mentioned proposals. Another ambiguity is the 
definition of public investment. The UK golden rule refers to net public investment, while 
Creel et al. (2002) seem to advocate for a rule on gross investment.  
Let us assume that a country wishes to maintain public debt at the level of public capital 
                                                 
11 This view was developed at the end of the 19th century by Leroy-Beaulieu (1891) and Jèze (1896). It can also 
be found for instance in Musgrave (1939) or Eisner (1989).  
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak 
 - 32 -
stock.12 Public debt in real terms is determined by: 1(1 ) pD D r sπ−= + − − , where sp is primary 
budget surplus. Public sector capital stock is determined by: 1 1K K I Kδ− −= + − . D K=  
implies that budget surplus: 1 1 1( )ps s rD I K Dδ π− − −= − = − − + . The correct interpretation of 
the golden rule is therefore that the cyclically-adjusted borrowing, net of net public 
investment and of debt depreciation should be at least in balance. 
According to the golden rule, borrowing may finance public investment, which is important in 
particular for countries which have are significant investment needs. Buiter and Grafe (2003) 
highlight the case of the future members of the European Union. Under this rule, countries 
will not cut public investment to improve government borrowing. Lowering public 
investment is harmful in terms of potential output growth if endogenous growth theory has 
some relevance. But it opens the Pandora box on the definition of public investment: should 
the definition of national accounts be the reference, or should all spending preparing for the 
future, like education or research be also taken into account, as proposed by Fitoussi (2002)? 
The rule also introduces a risk that governments increase public investment for short-term 
stabilisation purposes only.  
Balassone and Franco (2001) reject this rule in the name of the difficulties of measure. The 
rule implies that statisticians are able to estimate the cyclical part of government borrowing 
(therefore the output gap and its impact on public finances), public investment and public 
capital stock depreciation, in other words four measures that may be questioned. But is not it 
better to use a fair rule, estimated with a low degree of precision than to follow a wrong rule, 
estimated with precision?  
A more fundamental criticism is that this rule defines the neutrality of fiscal policy, cyclical 
neutrality (only automatic stabilisers are allowed to work) and structural neutrality (public 
savings equals public investment). But a government may choose not to be neutral. It may 
wish to implement an expansionary fiscal policy in times of subdued activity or may wish to 
run a restrictive policy in a period a high inflation. It may wish to implement structural 
measures if it thinks that saving is too high ex ante (which would necessitate a too low 
interest rate) or too low (in the light of demographic changes). The proposed rule confuses a 
criterion of neutrality with a norm for economic policy. As with the existing rule, there is no 
                                                 
12 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) also look for a condition that would assure that public debt remains equal to 
public capital stock. But they make the assumption that there is no inflation. Hence they forget debt 
depreciation. 
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certainty that the fiscal policy needed to reach a satisfying level of activity in a country which 
does not control the interest rate matches the golden rule. 
As shown in table 9, the four indicators give different results for public deficits. For instance, 
Italy’s structural deficit amounted to 1.9% of GDP in 1999, but turned into a surplus of 0.6% 
in terms of structural balance net of gross investment. There was a structural deficit of 0.7% 
excluding net public investment, which turned into a surplus of 1.2% excluding debt 
depreciation. 
Table 9. Four indicators for government borrowing (in 1999) 
Percentage of GDP 
 Cyclically-
adjusted 
balance 
(CAB) (1) 
Gross 
public 
investment 
(PI) (2) 
Public 
capital 
depreciatio
n 
Public 
debt 
depreciatio
n 
(DD) 
CAB 
+ gross PI 
CAB 
+ net PI 
CAB 
+ net PI 
+ DD 
Germany – 1.4 1.8 1.7 0.3 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.0 
France – 2.0 3.0 2.2 0.3 1.0 – 1.2 – 0.9 
Italy – 1.9 2.5 1.3 1.9 0.6 – 0.7 1.2 
UK 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.9 0.8 1.9 
(1) According to the European Commission. (2) Public investment refers to general government investment.  
Sources: European Commission, Autumn 2002 Economic Forecasts; OECD, National Accounts, Volume II – 1989-2000 (2002). 
 
Let us consider a country where the economic cycle is such that there is a 3% of GDP output 
gap in the trough of the cycle and where the elasticity of government borrowing to GDP is 
0.5. Public debt amounts to 50% of GDP, inflation to 2% and gross public investment 
represents 3% of GDP with a depreciation of 2%. In comparison with the existing rule, a rule 
under which countries would have to keep their structural current budget in balance 
(excluding gross public investment), gives a 3% of GDP supplementary margin on average 
over the cycle (see table 10), but it is not justified from an economic point of view. A rule 
based on structural balance excluding public net investment provides only a 1% of GDP 
supplementary margin on average. In the trough of the cycle, this rule is more restrictive than 
the existing one. If debt depreciation is taken into account, the improvement is very small as 
compared to the current rule in cyclical troughs (0.5% of GDP) but significant on average 
(2% of GDP).  
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Table 10. A comparison of four fiscal rules 
Percentage of GDP 
 SGP CAB+GPI CAB+NPI CAB+NPI+DD
Government borrowing needed     
— On average over a cycle 0 – 3 – 1 – 2 
— In the trough of the cycle – 3 – 4.5 – 2.5 – 3.5 
 
Should a better than the current rule be proposed? All fiscal rules based on government 
borrowing do not take into account the fact that public finances are only tools to support 
activity or to regulate the savings/investment equilibrium. Any proposal for a European fiscal 
rule, under the control of the Commission, neglects the fact that the surveillance of public 
finances in EMU should aim at avoiding that a country generates negative spill-over effects in 
partner countries rather than trying to define optimal national fiscal policies at the European 
level.  
6.4. A permanent balance rule 
In a similar approach, Buiter and Grafe (2003) and Buiter (2003) propose a permanent 
balance rule. Under this rule, the tax rate would be determined in permanence as: 
( )p p p pt g r n bπ= + − − , where gp is the permanent level of primary public spending in % of 
GDP, in other words the stable level of spending in % of GDP which would have the same 
discounted value than anticipated public spending; rp ,πp and np are respectively the permanent 
(i.e. on average over a cycle) interest rate, inflation rate and output growth; b is the debt to 
GDP ratio. With this a priori constant tax rate, anticipated public spending would be financed 
while public debt would be stabilised. The stability of the tax rate is optimal since it 
minimises the distortions arising from taxation. 
In the short run, the budget balance would be: (( ( )p p p pd g g r r n bπ= − − − − − . A country 
could raise public spending temporarily, as long as its tax policy is such that no risk of default 
of the public debt arises. This rule leaves room for active economic policy in the short term. It 
would also allow countries with relatively higher real output growth and inflation (Southern 
or Central and Eastern European countries) to run a higher public deficit (consistent with 
higher debt depreciation due to higher growth and inflation). A country having to increase 
public investment transitorily would be able to finance it through borrowing. An advantage of 
this rule is also that countries have to take future prospects into consideration. For example, a 
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country where pensions spending will increase in the future should start to raise taxes now.  
This rule has one major weakness: it would be very difficult to implement in practice. How 
can the permanent level of public spending be calculated? A country may decide to run a 
certain level of deficit today, saying that public spending will be cut tomorrow. As is 
recognised in Buiter and Grafe (2003), the level of public debt is undetermined under the 
permanent balance rule. A country with nominal output rising by an annual 4%, with an 
interest rate of 6% and a permanent level of public spending of 40% of GDP may chose to 
fulfil the rule with a public debt of 0% of GDP (i.e. with a balanced budget and a tax rate of 
40% of GDP), or with a 50% of GDP debt (i.e. with a 2% of GDP government borrowing and 
a tax rate of 41%), or with a debt of 100% of GDP (a 4% of GDP deficit and a tax rate of 
42%). The rule does not say how fiscal policy should react to a demand shock. Besides, if 
public spending in year t benefits mostly the generation of year t, it is difficult to see why 
public spending should be paid by former generations. If the rises in old-age pensions 
spending benefit generations who will live longer, they cannot justify a rise in contributions 
paid by former generations. Buiter and Grafe raise the relevant issue of the intergenerational 
equity of public spending, but this cannot be ensured by an automatic rule. Each category of 
spending is specific. Last, and this is recognised by the authors, the rule sets an optimal fiscal 
rule at the national level. But it does not aim at defining surveillance criteria or a fiscal policy 
co-ordination strategy in EMU.  
6.5. Quality of public finances 
Several economists, like Buti and Giudice (2002), propose that the Pact takes the quality of 
public spending into account. Thus a country would be entitled to a higher deficit if domestic 
public investment is high, if it embarks on restructuring its public finances or if it undertakes 
tax cuts programmes. Conversely, countries would be blamed if they cut government 
borrowing through tax rises instead of lower public spending. This proposal introduces a new 
arbitrary. Should European authorities be entitled to reward countries that way? In our view, 
each country should remain responsible of the control of the quality of its fiscal policy.  
6.6. A public expenditure rule 
Brunila (2002), among others, proposed to add a complementary rule setting limits to public 
expenditure (excluding interest payments and unemployment allowances). This type of rule 
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would be easy to implement and to control since the level of public spending is more easily 
controlled by governments than tax receipts. Members States would set a target for the 
medium-run growth of public expenditure and let receipts fluctuate with the economic cycle. 
This is the policy the French government had decided to run at the end of the 1990s. 
Countries with excessive structural government borrowing would have to cut the share of 
public spending in GDP. This proposal is in line with the Commission’s view, according to 
which Members States should cut public expenses instead of increasing the fiscal burden. 
This proposal suffers from two weaknesses. First, automatic stabilisers are allowed to work, 
but discretionary polices are not, which has no economic justification. Second, the 
appropriate level of public expenditure should be decided at the national level at the present 
stage of European integration. It is a social choice which should not become a 
macroeconomic one. No constraint should prevent a country from raising domestic public 
spending – pensions, health or unemployment – as long as it is financed by taxation. 
6.7. Fiscal Policy Committees  
Wyplosz (2002) proposes to establish a fiscal policy committee of independent experts in 
each Member State. This Committee would be given the mandate of ensuring debt 
sustainability. Hence his task would be the regulation of budgetary policy. The Committee 
would set the level of government borrowing, while public spending and receipts would 
remain under the control of national governments and parliaments. After the ECB’s 
independence, this is a new step towards leaving economic policy entirely under the 
responsibility of a technocracy. The Committee would have to care for long-run public debt 
sustainability, while the objective of output stabilisation will come in second. Unfortunately, 
the author has difficulty in defining debt sustainability. Two possible definitions are given: 
balanced budget over the economic cycle (which means a public debt of 0% of GDP in the 
long run), stabilisation of the debt to GDP ratio in the medium run (i.e. excluding cyclical 
effects), but the author reckons that it is impossible to set an optimal level for this ratio. The 
author does not discuss the feasibility of his proposal. Changing economic circumstances lead 
observed budgets to differ from planned budgets. The Committee would have to control 
government policies in permanence and possibly ask for changes in taxation. Would this be 
acceptable for national governments? In an economic downturn, what would be the 
Committee’s trade-off between the objectives of output stabilisation and debt stabilisation? 
More fundamentally, should macroeconomic strategy be decided without democratic debate? 
Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Breaking the Ice 
 - 37 -
6.8. An economic policy charter 
Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry (2000) made several proposals. The most original was to ask 
European authorities (Commission, Council and ECB) to set up a group of experts in charge 
of elaborating an economic policy charter. This document would settle the way economic 
(monetary and fiscal) policies should react in response to any economic shock (supply or 
demand shock, asymmetric or symmetric). Debates, such as the appropriateness of fiscal 
deficits in bad times, would disappear. The second proposal was to improve the transparency 
of economic and monetary policies: the ECB would be asked to abandon the M3 growth pillar 
and to set more precisely its inflation target. Countries would have to state clearly their short-
term and medium-term fiscal strategy. The third proposal was to give the Eurogroup the 
responsibility of piloting the euro area economic policy, the decisions being possibly made by 
qualified majority. We have already seen the problems this would raise: the fundamental issue 
is whether budgetary polices should be co-ordinated or decided at the European level. In the 
first case, the Eurogroup cannot impose a certain fiscal policy on a Member State. The fourth 
proposal would be to improve the interaction of national and European processes regarding 
the elaboration of budgets, the BEPGs and the stability programmes. This would significantly 
increase the influence of European processes on national budgetary procedures and would 
raise difficult questions in terms of organisation and agenda. 
6.9. The surveillance of public debts 
Pisani-Ferry (2002) proposed that fiscal discipline should focus on debts rather than deficits, 
since it is an excessively high level of debt that may threaten the sustainability of public 
finances. The author proposes to take off-balance sheet liabilities (like old-age pensions) into 
account in the assessment of public debt levels. But in that case, anticipated receipts should 
be considered too, like social contributions. The proposal opens the door to a never-ending 
process. But it has to be recognised that the notion of ‘public debt’ is basically ambiguous. 
The Treaty refers to an accounting definition of gross public debt, which has no economic 
meaning: public debt can be reduced through privatisation receipts, leasing operations on 
public infrastructures, etc. 
Pisani-Ferry suggests that countries may opt for a ‘debt sustainability pact’. Countries could 
on a voluntary basis make public their off-balance debts; they would commit themselves to 
maintaining the debt to GDP ratio below 50% and to a target for the debt to GDP ratio over a 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak 
 - 38 -
5 year horizon. Hence, they would not be subject to the excessive deficit procedure based on 
public deficits. The proposal suffers several weaknesses. The notion of ‘off-balance debts’ is 
unclear. The 50% figure is arbitrary and has the only characteristic of being below 60%. The 
proposal does not give a definition of the medium-term commitment: debt reduction or 
stabilisation? It does not mention how cyclical effects should be considered: the debt to GDP 
ratio deteriorates automatically in times of subdued activity because of rising government 
borrowing and of output stagnation. How should this be taken into account (see box 4)? This 
proposal deals with the negative spill-over effects of debt but its does not take into account 
the negative spill-over effects of inflation. A country with a low level of debt would be able to 
undertake an excessively expansionary and inflationary fiscal policy. Partner countries and 
the Commission would be unable to stop it before the debt ratio reaches 50% of GDP. 
Piloting fiscal policies with a debt rule is even less precise than with a deficit rule. 
The idea of a sustainability Pact can also be found is Cœuré and Pisani-Ferry (2003). Each 
country would have to publish a ‘comprehensive balance sheet of the public sector’ (including 
off-balance elements), to prepare long-term plans providing evidence of future public 
sustainability, and to infer from these plans an operational target for the gross debt to GDP 
ratio. This target would depend on public sector assets and liabilities. A fiscal rule would then 
be announced by the government, which would ensure that the actual debt to GDP ratio will 
converge to the objective. This rule would have to be approved by the Commission and the 
Council, which would be responsible for its monitoring. It is uneasy to understand how this 
complicated procedure based on a large number of long-term assumptions may be 
implemented in practice. It is also difficult to understand why euro area countries should be 
subject to such a procedure, contrary to the US, the UK, Japan, Russia… It is difficult to see 
why there is a specific risk for debt sustainability in the euro area. The proposed procedure 
would put excessive pressure on future public health and old-age pensions spending while 
these types of spending can be financed provided that citizens are willing to pay for them. 
Besides, the proposal does not say a word on short-term fiscal policies. Would a country be 
entitled to higher deficits in 2003 if it has announced the implementation of a reform due to 
lower public pensions after 2010?  
Pisani-Ferry (2002) also suggested that a macroeconomic dialogue should take place in 
Europe between the ECB, the Member States and the Commission on the notion of 
equilibrium rate of unemployment and on the ways to lower it. The author suggested that 
stabilisation policies should be considered apart from structural policies. Stabilisation policies 
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would be responsible for maintaining demand at the level of the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, while structural policies would aim at reducing the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. Given the uncertainties surrounding the measures of this equilibrium rate, it is 
difficult to see how the debate could take place. On the one hand, the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment probably depends on past observed unemployment, hence on short-term 
economic policy: in a country where output growth is subdued, employees and employers are 
not tempted to develop skills through training programmes, unemployed people become 
unemployable, rising social benefits entail higher labour taxation, the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment rises. On the other hand, it is impossible to link seriously a given labour 
market reform with the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The proposal could contribute to 
put pressure on unions so that they accept further liberalisation of labour markets against 
promises of more expansionary macroeconomic policies. 
6.10. Lowering public debt  
Gros (2003) thinks that the Pact should put emphasis on debt levels rather than deficits, 
because he considers public finance sustainability to be the major risk. He proposes to add a 
new element to the excessive deficit procedure, by setting a minimal speed for debt reduction 
in countries where debt levels stand largely above the 60% of GDP threshold. In practice, 
these countries would be requested to cut the differential between their debt ratio and the 
reference ratio by 5% each year. Thus a country with a 100% of GDP debt would have to 
bring it down the following year to 100 – 0.05 (100 – 60) = 98% of GDP. 
This proposal does not address the issue of the compatibility between a priori set targets for 
public finance and the necessity to reach short-term and medium-term macroeconomic 
equilibrium. Let b, the level of public debt as a share of GDP, g: nominal output growth. The 
proposed rule requires that the deficit, d is such that 13% ( 5%)d b g−< + − . With an annual 
nominal output growth higher than 5%, the rule is less strict than the 3% of GDP reference. In 
economic slowdowns, the rule will impose weaker and weaker deficits as output growth 
decelerates. The rule is therefore pro-cyclical. In the medium term, the rule will be less strict 
than the close-to-balance or in surplus target for deficits: a country having a 100% of GDP 
debt ratio will be allowed to run a deficit of 1% of GDP under the assumption of a 3% of 
GDP nominal growth. 
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6.11. New rules 
Calmfors et al. (2003) stress out the need for different and discretionary national fiscal 
policies in a monetary union, these policies having an impact on activity. However, the 
authors think that such policies are uneasy to implement, in particular because of long 
decisions lags and also because there is a risk of irreversibility of decisions and of 
expansionary bias. The authors point out the rise in public debts in the European Union from 
1980 to 1996, but they do not consider the role of monetary policy in this rise (Creel and 
Sterdyniak, 1995). Thus the authors think the EMU should provide an opportunity to 
strengthen fiscal discipline.  
As the authors believe that the major risk is debt unsustainability, they suggest that the limit 
for deficits should depend on public debt levels. Thus, the limit would be 0.5% of GDP for 
countries where debt stands above 105% of GDP, 1% for countries where debt stands around 
100% of GDP, 3% for countries where debt is close to 60%, 4% for countries where debt is 
40%, etc. This would be an incentive for Member States to reduce public debt so as to get 
more cyclical room for manoeuvre. The proposal raises constraints on highly indebted 
countries: Italy, Belgium and Greece. But in the case of the first two countries, the 
opportunity of the constraint can be questioned since the level of public debt has a counterpart 
in a high households’ saving ratio. The constraint comes as an additional similar constraint of 
the objective of a medium run budget in balance, which implies a continuing decrease in the 
public debt to GDP ratio. The proposal follows a weird logic according to which a country 
having no control on its domestic interest rate may decide arbitrarily to determine the 
domestic debt level. Let us consider a country where there is an initial debt to GDP ratio of 
60%. In order to cut this level to 40%, the government may decide to run a restrictive fiscal 
policy of 2% of GDP during 10 years. This policy will not lead to a significant cut in the 
ECB’s interest rate but it will almost certainly durably depress activity, for a dubious 
usefulness. 
The authors also suggest that the excessive deficit procedure be under the authority of the 
European court of justice. The 3% of GDP limit would be legally binding. Is this advisable, 
knowing that there is no economic rationale for this limit, and that a country may well breach 
it without generating negative externalities?  
Last the authors propose that Member States be obliged to make their national fiscal policy 
procedures conform to a common framework, which would guarantee that ‘good decisions’ 
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are made at the national level, independently of the European level. They design two possible 
schemes:  
— Each Member State would have to adopt a “law on fiscal policy”, which would set 
precisely the objectives for public deficits, debts and stabilisation. This law would indicate 
the instruments to be used transitorily for cyclical purposes. This law would guarantee ex ante 
national budgetary policies in conformity with European requirements. Is it realistic to 
maintain a priori fiscal policy in a very constraining framework, especially when fiscal policy 
is the only national policy tool available? It is an illusion to believe that a law voted at some 
point will be a commitment for a future government, elected with another majority and facing 
another position of the economic cycle, some years later.  
— Each country would have to implement a ‘fiscal policy committee’, as advocated by 
Wyplosz (2002). This committee would be in charge of maintaining public debt sustainability 
and output stabilisation, either by setting the level of government balance, or by setting itself 
the level of some taxes. This proposal shares the view of those who think that democratically 
elected governments, thus the People, should be deprived of their authority, and that this 
responsibility should be given to a group of experts or technocrats. This is a dangerous by-
product of European construction. 
6.12. An aggregate balance target 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn had proposed at the informal Ecofin Council in Dresden in April 
1999 that the Eurogroup should first discuss and set the desired policy for the euro area, 
before setting the global objective for the area. The global target would be broken down into 
national targets in a second step.  
The proposal did not say if the ECB would participate in the co-ordination process. If the 
ECB and Members States agreed on explicit co-ordination to control inflation and activity, 
then the outcome could be similar to the ideal example described in box 3. Interest rates 
would assure a satisfying level of aggregate activity; government balances would assure a 
satisfying level of national activity. If the ECB did not participate in the co-ordination process 
and if co-ordination targeted only government balances, then no improvement could be 
expected as compared to the existing situation. It is difficult to understand how the aggregate 
public deficit target would be defined and ‘shared’ between Member States. 
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6.13. Some internal adjustment only 
Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003) think that the mechanisms of the Pact work relatively well. 
They propose only limited changes to achieve ‘stronger discipline and higher flexibility’. 
They have five suggestions: 
— Country-by-country medium-term targets. Countries with a relatively low level of (explicit 
and implicit) public debt would be allowed to have a medium-term deficit target in the range 
of 1 to 1.5% of GDP. Thus deficits would not breach easily the 3% limit, which remains the 
absolute reference, in times of economic slowdown. With a medium run deficit target of 1.5% 
of GDP, the debt to GDP ratio could remain close from 30% (with a 5% nominal GDP 
growth). With this proposal, a more realistic long-run debt objective becomes possible. In 
practice, such a softening of the rules would not benefit countries like France, Germany, or 
Italy with large public pensions systems (and a large implicit debt). If these counties want 
more flexibility in the conduct of fiscal policy, they will have first to cut the size of their pay-
as-you-go retirement systems. This proposal is designed to facilitate the UK membership in 
the euro area.  
— Improving transparency. The authors ask countries, or Eurostat, to publish real ‘structural 
balances’, i.e. corrected from exceptional and one-off measures (UMTS licences, leasing or 
securitisation operations, one-off taxes...). We can only agree with them. 
— Tackling ‘misbehaviour’ in good times. The authors want to prevent countries from 
stopping fiscal consolidation efforts during high-growth periods, as was the case in 1998-
2000. They suggest that early-warning procedures could be launched against countries which 
have not sufficiently reduced their structural deficit (even if they have cut their public deficit). 
But this procedure requires an agreement on the level of potential output and on the optimal 
level of deficit. 
— A ‘Rainy-day fund’. Countries would put some money in a specific fund in good times, and 
would withdraw these resources in bad times. This proposal looks somehow awkward 
because such purely financial operations have no impact on government borrowing in 
national accounts. There is no difference between using receipts for debt reduction and 
allocating them to a fund. Thus the authors suggest a change in national accounts 
methodology, so that transfers to the fund would raise public deficits and that withdrawals 
would reduce public deficits. For instance, a government running a surplus of 1% of GDP in 
2000 could transfer it to the fund. If there was a public deficit of 3.5% of GDP in 2002, the 
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government would have the possibility to bring it down to 2.5% with a 1% withdrawal from 
the fund. But national accounts methodology must be based on economic logic and not on 
political arrangements. As the European Commission (2002c) writes, ‘Eurostat acts in 
accordance with the principles of [...] scientific independence’. Policy makers have to 
improve economic policy rules but they should not be allowed to change the instrument of 
measure.  
— A non-partisan implementation of the rules. The authors suggest that the Commission 
should be given more power to deliver early-warnings, to determine the existence of 
excessive deficits, to decide of sanctions. Such a reform seems inappropriate to us, as long as 
fiscal rules are not better designed. A soft implementation of the Pact remains necessary. 
7. Our proposal 
The European economic policy framework is a matter of political choice: what decisions 
should (or not) be democratically debated? What powers should be in national or community 
hands? It is also a technical choice: monetary and fiscal policies must be compatible. 
It could be imagined to establish a democratically elected economic government of Europe, 
which would be responsible for monetary and budgetary decisions. But this is currently a 
utopia. Democratic debate has remained at the national level and business cycles as well as 
institutions still differ from one country to another. It is difficult to imagine how an economic 
government of Europe could address all national issues. 
The conduct of monetary and fiscal policies could be given to the European Commission. But 
the Commission has no democratic legitimacy. National governments would loose all degrees 
of freedom in the conduct of national economic policies, would have to follow strictly the 
strategy of the Commission and would ask its permission to undertake any measure. It would 
be the triumph of the Community, Technocratic and Liberal ideology.  
The government could be left under the responsibility of an ‘Ecofin Council of the euro area’, 
but this would mean giving excessive power to the ministers for economics and finance, at the 
expense the other ministers and of national parliaments. Any government intending to 
introduce a new measure would have to get an authorisation from its partners first. It is 
difficult to imagine that the French government elected in 1997 would have asked for its 
partners’ approval before introducing the 35-hour working week for instance, or that the 
German government would have submitted its fiscal reform to its partners’ approval. Would 
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this group of ministers be entitled to decide on the reforms of the pensions systems to be 
implemented in the different Member States? 
Given the current level of European political integration, countries and governments must 
keep their prerogative on national fiscal policy, as long as it does not affect the 
macroeconomic position of the area. The surveillance of economic policies should consist in 
avoiding that any national fiscal policy negatively affects the rest of the area. That is why 
binding rules should bear directly on externalities.13  
Thus, the rule should be that each country may be allowed to define national fiscal policy, as 
long as it does not affect the macroeconomic equilibrium of the area, in other words as long 
as domestic inflation stays in line with the inflation target of the area. For instance, if there 
was an inflation target of between 1.5% and 3.5% in the area, one could imagine that 
Northern countries would could be given a target within 1 and 3%, while ‘Southern’ countries 
(more precisely the countries on a catching-up process) would have a target of between 2 and 
4%. In such a system, a country hit by a negative demand shock would be able to 
counterbalance it through temporary fiscal loosening. Conversely, a country hit by a supply 
shock (inflationary pressures) would have to tighten fiscal policy. 
The Commission and the Ecofin Council of the euro area would have the responsibility to 
check that inflation remains at the level set in each country, and possibly to accept some 
deviations and adjustment periods in the event of specific or common shocks. The European 
authorities could also have the responsibility to check that domestic public debt variations do 
not put the sustainability of public finances at risk, or to check that no country has an 
excessively large current account deficit relatively to the current account balance of the area. 
The crucial point is that surveillance should bear only on issues potentially leading to 
negative externalities between countries in the area. 
However, this organisation does not define the respective roles of monetary policy and fiscal 
policies considered as a whole. A satisfying level of global demand, compatible with the 
desired inflation-production trade-off may be obtained either through a combination of high 
interest rates and public deficits or a combination of low interest rates and public deficits (see 
box 5). The second combination will induce higher private investment and therefore will be 
                                                 
13 Otherwise it opens the door to supranational paternalism, as pointed out in Buiter (2003): ‘we know what is 
good for you and you will do it, even though your failure to do what is good for you would have no detrimental 
impact on the other members of the club’. 
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preferable in terms of medium run output growth. 
Box 5. Compatibility between monetary policy and fiscal policies 
Let us consider the model presented in boxes 1 and 2. In order to reach the inflation target, it is 
necessary that: 0 /i i ig n r dσ π αΣ − = −Σ − Σ  at the area level. This is compatible with a situation of 
high interest rates and high public deficits or with a situation of low interest rates and low public 
deficits. Therefore, a process where monetary policy and fiscal policies are fully compatible has 
to be found. The optimal medium-run strategy is that the central bank sets an interest rate target, 
objr , equal to nominal output growth, i.e. the lowest rate compatible with economic efficiency. 
Fiscal policies would be responsible for the respect of the inflation target. Each country would 
have to target the following level of production: 0 /i iy π α= − , and consequently their public 
deficit would be 0 / obji i ig d rπ α σ= − − + . 
 
The compatibility between monetary policy and fiscal policies has to be planned. In our view, 
the best rule is the following: monetary and fiscal policies should set a common medium-term 
objective aiming at the convergence of real interest rates with output growth, meaning the 
lower interest rate consistent with economic efficiency. If the long-term real interest rate is 
higher than output growth, it means that investment is too weak: monetary policy should cut 
interest rates and should be accompanied by restrictive fiscal policies in the countries where 
the interest rates cuts would raise excessively inflation. But as long as the real interest rate 
equals output growth, a country cannot be blamed for running some public deficit if this is 
necessary to support domestic activity. National fiscal policies should be in charge of 
managing the inflation-production trade-off in each country, under the constraint of a 
medium-run inflation, while monetary policy should target the interest rate.  
Medium-term ‘close-to-balance or in surplus’ budgetary positions are not a major issue 
Europe should address today, in the context of highly volatile stock markets and of uncertain 
short-term economic prospects. The US government has undertaken a discretionary fiscal 
policy in the recent slowdown, while euro area governments hesitate to let automatic 
stabilisers work. The ECB is very careful not to seem to support ‘budget deviations’ which 
does not help the implementation of a credible policy mix in the euro area. The current 
weakness of activity illustrates the need for economic policy to be less ‘automatically’ 
managed in the euro area. An open process of co-ordination is needed. 
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